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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1966, the Federal Communications Commission has, one way 
or another, protected businesses that deliver services over the nation’s 
communications infrastructure. But in January 2014, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s net neutrality rules 
contained in its 2010 Open Internet Order.1 FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler 
has since indicated that he will take up the D.C. Circuit’s invitation to 
implement rules that, consistent with historic practice, “will meet the court’s 
test for preventing improper blocking of and discrimination among Internet 
traffic.”2 
Chairman Wheeler’s statement invites an obvious question: presuming 
that the FCC wants its rules to survive judicial scrutiny, what is the most 
prudent legal course? While the Commission has a variety of legal options, 
we focus here on two solutions that are almost certain to survive legal 
challenge, while not taking any position on the merits of possible 
alternatives.    
We propose a novel option that relies on a partial return to the powers 
delegated to the FCC by Title II of the Communications Act.3 In particular, 
we suggest that the Commission take seriously the asymmetric framework 
suggested by the D.C. Circuit based on the premise that two distinct 
transmissions comprise a single broadband transaction. Consider a common 
usage of a broadband connection: first, the subscriber—the consumer—calls 
an application, service, or other content provider using the carrier facilities 
for which she has purchased access. Second, the content provider sends a 
response to the consumer, which necessarily traverses the broadband 
carrier’s facilities to reach the original consumer. This two-stage process is 
the framework adopted by the D.C. Circuit; as the court emphasized, it may 
be “logical to conclude that [a broadband provider] may be a common carrier 
with regard to some activities but not others.”4    
                                                                                                                 
 1. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, Report and Order, 
FCC 10-201, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order], 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636–42 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
 2. Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Statement on the FCC’s Open Internet 
Rules (Feb. 19, 2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-325654A1.pdf; see Open Internet Remand, Public Notice, FCC 
GN Docket No. 14-28 (rel. Feb. 19, 2014); see also Protecting and Promoting the 
Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 14-61 
(2014), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/ 
2014/db0515/FCC-14-61A1.pdf. 
 3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-231 (2006). 
 4. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 653 (citing NARUC v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976)); see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979).  




The FCC may therefore decide, as a matter of first impression, that 
response transactions are subject to common carrier rules against 
discrimination and blocking. Indeed, as we explain below, none of the 
arguments that the information service designation applies to a broadband 
connection’s call service can be said to apply to the response transaction. 
Cabining the reach of the Commission’s Cable Modem Order, which 
designated the call transaction an information service,5 to only the first stage 
of the two-stage framework would restore the Commission’s authority to 
enforce network neutrality rules over broadband-delivered content. In 
addition, because such sender-side regulation focuses on incoming traffic, it 
also provides a useful framework for addressing interconnection disputes 
between broadband carriers and content providers. 
Alternatively, the FCC could simply examine whether changed 
circumstances have undermined its decade-old decision 6  to reclassify 
broadband transmissions from telecommunications services to information 
services. Our examination of the Commission’s analysis shows that the 
factual premises underlying its 2002 conclusion are now largely obsolete. 
That decision relied on the outdated premise that broadband subscriptions 
were akin to dial-up services including AOL, all of which offered a bundle 
of services including email access, branded web browsers, newsgroups, chat 
rooms, and other Internet-based services. Today, the relevance of these 
bundled services is highly diminished, as broadband subscribers 
overwhelmingly rely on third-party services and products such as Gmail, 
Firefox, Google Groups, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.7  
Thus, the FCC has at least two available paths. The first is 
predominantly legal: by adopting the two-stage framework articulated by the 
D.C. Circuit in Verizon, the Commission need only decide whether sender-
side transmissions fit more comfortably within the statutory definition of a 
telecommunications service or an information service. The second path is 
predominantly factual: Is the Commission still swayed by its analysis, now 
well over a decade old, analogizing broadband subscription services to dial-
up Internet access? Regardless of the path the Commission chooses, it will 
reach a similar destination. Either course allows the Commission to develop 
a regime that resembles its approach in the 1980s and 1990s—a period 
notable for the exponential growth of the telecommunications and Internet 
industries.   
                                                                                                                 
 5. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other 
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 02-77, 17 
FCC Rcd. 4798, paras. 34–41 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order].  
 6. Id. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.B.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
For nearly fifty years, the FCC has enforced a regime whose basic 
purpose has been to foster the growth of network application providers and 
protect them from the owners of network facilities.8 The most recent iteration 
of that regime, which attempted to enforce a form of basic network neutrality 
norms, was contained within the Commission’s Open Internet Order,9 but in 
fact the history of that effort stretches back into the 1960s. 
A. The Original Antidiscrimination Regime 
The relevant history of the net neutrality regime begins with the FCC’s 
Computer Inquiries that began in 1966.10 Context is important here. The late 
1960s marked the beginning of a historic shift at the Commission and the 
White House away from support for a regulated monopoly and toward the 
encouragement of competitive markets—especially in new markets.11 This 
shift was driven both by the FCC and the Office of Telecommunications 
Policy in the White House; its long-term effects were nothing short of 
monumental.12 
The project began with selected segments of the communications 
industry, primarily long-distance telephony, satellite services, attachments, 
and what was then called “network data processing” (now known as Internet 
services).13 In each of these areas, the FCC developed a new regulatory 
initiative with two overarching goals.14 
First, given the long history of regulation resulting in barriers to entry, 
the FCC attempted to avoid overregulation of new markets to encourage 
competition.15 Second, the Commission recognized that any new entrant in 
these markets would necessarily depend on monopoly carriers, and would 
therefore be exceptionably vulnerable to anticompetitive behavior.16 Hence, 
the project’s second goal was to prevent the carriers from undermining these 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at 18044–45 (2010) (Copps, 
Comm’r, concurring).  
 9. See generally id. 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 18045 (Copps, Comm’r, concurring) (referring to the 
“Computer Inquiries”); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 05-150, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, paras. 4 & n.9, 21 (2005) [hereinafter 
DSL Reclassification Order]. 
 11. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH, chs. 7, 14 (2010) (tracing 
FCC regulatory action from Hush-A-Phone through the Bell divestiture). 
 12. Id. at 187. 
 13. Id. at 189. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 116. 
 16. See id. at para. 26.  




new entrants. 17  These two goals underlay the Commission’s Carterfone 
decision and the subsequent liberalization of network attachments, the 
various MCI and Execunet decisions,18 which opened to competition the 
long-distance telephony market, the “Open Skies” policy for satellites,19 and, 
most relevant to our purposes, the Computer Inquiries.20  The combined 
effect of these policies was to create a communications economy that relied 
on common carriage services as the foundation for other markets, and 
eventually, entire industries. Indeed, the entire Internet economy may be 
understood as an unexpected byproduct of the policies pursued in the 
Computer Inquiries. 21  
This philosophy of opening markets on top of the network drove the 
FCC’s First Computer Inquiry. The 1966 Notice of Inquiry that began the 
FCC’s first foray into this space sought “information, views, and 
recommendations” regarding the vast “number of regulatory and policy 
questions” that had come to the fore through the “the growing convergence 
of computers and communications.”22 In the Notice, the Commission sought 
to determine “under what circumstances data processing, computer 
information, and message switching services . . . should be subject to the 
provisions of the Communications Act.”23  
While the technologies of this era were different, the basic architecture 
of the regulatory problem is familiar. Companies, such as Electronic Data 
Systems (founded by entrepreneur Ross Perot), located at the “ends” of the 
telephone network, were offering computer services that ran “over” AT&T’s 
wires.24 Conceptually, firms such as EDS occupied a position similar to 
                                                                                                                 
 17. WU, supra note 11, at 189–90.  
 18. See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of 
Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 845–47 (1997) (discussing 
FCC rulemaking and litigation regarding MCI and Execunet). 
 19. See Establishment of Domestic Commc’ns-Satellite Facilities by Non-
Governmental Entities, Report and Order, FCC 70-306, 22 F.C.C. 2d 86 (1970); 
Establishment of Domestic Commc’ns-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental 
Entities, Second Report and Order, FCC 72-531, 35 F.C.C. 2d 844 (1972), recon. in 
part, Establishment of Domestic Commc’ns-Satellite Facilities by Non-
Governmental Entities, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 72-1198, 38 F.C.C. 
2d 665 (1972). 
 20. See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. 
 21. See WU, supra note 11, at 197–99. 
 22. Reg. & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & 
Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, FCC 66-1004, 7 F.C.C. 2d 11, para. 
2 (1966) [hereinafter Computer I Notice]. 
 23. Id. at para. 18. 
 24. See, e.g., Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. 
Provision of Enhanced Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 95-48, 10 FCC 
Rcd. 8360, paras. 32, 33 n.81 (1995). 
472 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 66 
Netflix or Wikipedia today, while the role of AT&T is now played by such 
carriers as Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T.25 
As noted, the FCC was motivated by an interest in avoiding 
overregulation in the new data processing market and protecting that nascent 
industry from the monopoly carrier. The First Computer Inquiry achieved 
the first goal by exempting data processing services from common carrier 
regulation. 26  The FCC accomplished its second goal with the Inquiry’s 
“maximum separation” rule, which required an incumbent carrier to form an 
entirely separate corporate entity if it wished to offer data processing or 
computer networking services. 27  The FCC believed that if AT&T was 
allowed to freely enter the market for network services, it could give itself 
unfair advantages to quickly eliminate competitors. 28  The Commission 
feared that the Bell companies would “favor their own data processing 
activities by discriminatory services, cross subsidization, [and] improper 
pricing,” and therefore required that any carrier seeking to provide both 
transmission and processing capabilities segregate its offerings into 
“separate corporate entit[ies].”29  
To address cases where the distinction between data “transmission” 
and “processing” was less clear, the FCC defined a category of “hybrid” 
services30 that were regulated according to the regime that governed the 
“primary thrust” of the offering: Where transmission predominated, the 
service would be subject to regulation under the Communications Act; where 
data processing predominated, only the maximum separation rule applied.31 
Importantly, the Commission deferred further guidance on the distinction 
within hybrid services. 32  Instead, the FCC offered to conduct “ad hoc 
                                                                                                                 
 25. In 2005, twenty-one years after AT&T’s court-ordered divestiture, SBC—
a Regional Bell Operating Company previously known as Southwestern Bell—
acquired its former parent AT&T, thus creating the nation’s largest unified 
telecommunications company. See WU, supra note 11, at 238–49. 
 26. Reg. & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C. 
2d 291, para. 24 (1970) [hereinafter Computer I Initial Decision]. 
 27. Id. at para. 35. 
 28. See id. at paras. 25–26. 
 29. Id. at paras. 33, 36; see also Reg. & Policy Problems Presented by the 
Interdependence of Computer & Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, Final Decision and 
Order, FCC 71-255, 28 F.C.C. 2d 267, para. 12 (1971) [hereinafter Computer I Final 
Decision] (maintaining decision reached in Computer I Initial Decision); 47 C.F.R. 
§ 64.702(c) (2013). 
 30. Computer I Initial Decision, supra note 26, at para. 39; Computer I Final 
Decision, supra note 29, at para. 31. 
 31. Computer I Initial Decision, supra note 26, at paras. 41–42; Computer I 
Final Decision, supra note 29, at paras. 31–32. 
 32. See generally Computer I Initial Decision, supra note 26. 




evaluations . . . to determine whether a particular package offering was 
essentially data processing or communication.”33 
In 1979, the FCC’s Second Computer Inquiry eliminated the confusing 
“hybrid” service and established a regime with just two layers: basic and 
enhanced services.34 The new taxonomy created the first clear horizontal 
regulatory model in FCC history,35 with its rough recognition of a transport 
layer and an application layer. Computer II put all firms offering services 
over the network into the enhanced category36 and exempted them from most 
regulation.37 At the same time, it maintained the common carriage rules for 
the underlying transport services that supported this growing industry.38     
The Computer II approach was the governing regulatory regime during 
the period of the exponential growth during the 1980s and 1990s in the 
computer networking and Internet industries.39 Notably, the explosion in 
network services during this time casts serious doubt on the claims that any 
regulation under Title II is necessarily inconsistent with economic growth.40 
To the contrary, the clever design of Computer II, which avoided 
overregulation of application-layer industries while simultaneously 
protecting them from carrier threats of blocking or discrimination, actually 
fueled growth in application-layer services.41 Thus, the Computer II model 
can be understood as a great boon to firms like AOL and MSN, which 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 29, at para. 27. 
 34. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regs., Final 
Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, paras. 88–102 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final 
Decision]. 
 35. See Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New 
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 
FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 615 (2004). 
 36. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 34, at para. 114 (There is “no 
regulatory distinction between enhanced services.”); see id. at paras. 5, 96, 109. 
 37. Id. at paras. 107, 119–120. 
 38. Id. at paras. 7, 12. Basic services included voice services. The revised rules 
also limited the application of the “maximum separation” rule to only AT&T and 
GTE (now known as Verizon). 
 39. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
925, 930 (2001) (“The Internet is the fastest growing network in history. In its thirty 
years of existence, its population has grown a million times over.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an 
Internet-Based World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 557 (2013) (“[T]o the extent that the 
Internet generates positive externalities, imposing regulation would represent the 
opposite policy, systematically causing the systematic bias toward underproduction 
to worsen.”). 
 41. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications 
Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 169 (2003); Jonathan 
Weinberg, The Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal Service 
Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 
YALE J. ON REG. 211, 222 (1999). 
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provided low-cost network services simply by buying volumes of telephone 
numbers, as well as to the first wave of “dot-com” firms, such as Netscape 
and Yahoo!, which were able to reach users without paying costly 
termination fees to carriers. 
The Computer II model survived until the early 2000s. Congress 
codified it in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, merely changing its 
nomenclature: an “enhanced service” was effectively renamed an 
“information service,” and “basic service” became “telecommunications 
service.” 42  Although Computer II was largely codified in statute, some 
details of the regime were modified by the Commission’s lengthy Third 
                                                                                                                 
 42. The Act’s definition of a “telecommunications service”—the commercial 
offering of the transmission of user information between two points without any 
change to the information—mirrored the FCC’s understanding of a “basic service” 
under Computer II. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(50), (53), with Computer II Final 
Decision, supra note 34, at para. 96 (basic service “offers a pure transmission 
capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its 
interaction with customer supplied information.”). See also Computer II Final 
Decision, supra note 34, at para. 5.Similarly, the Act’s definition of “information 
service”—“the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, 
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications”—sounds in Computer II’s “enhanced service” definition. 
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) with Computer II Final Decision, supra note 34, at 
para. 97 (in enhanced service, for example, “applications are used to act on the 
content, code, protocol, and other aspects of the subscriber's information.”). See also 
Computer II Final Decision, supra note 34, at para. 5. 
For more on the similarities between Computer II and the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, see Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, FCC 98-
67, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, para. 21 (1998) (“[W]e find that Congress intended the 
categories of ‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service’ to parallel the 
definitions of ’basic service’ and ’enhanced service’ developed in our Computer II 
proceeding . . . .”). See also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977 (2005) (“The definitions of the terms telecommunications 
service and information service established by the 1996 Act are similar to the 
Computer II basic- and enhanced-service classifications.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., Notice of Inquiry, FCC 10-114, 
25 FCC Rcd. 7866, para. 13 (2010) (the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “codif[ied] 
the Commission’s distinction” from the Computer Inquiries); Kevin Werbach, The 
Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1774–75 (2011) (noting subtle difference in 
definitions). 




Computer Inquiry, 43  which, most notably, eliminated the “maximum 
separation” rule.44 
B. From Computer II to Information Service 
Until the turn of the millennium, the Internet industry—that is, the set 
of application-layer data businesses that depended on networked 
telecommunications infrastructure—blossomed under a regime that both 
deregulated its services and protected them from carrier interference under 
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. Shortly thereafter, the FCC 
sought to preserve these critical goals under a new regulatory structure. It 
moved to an alternative regime that reclassified all Internet services—
including the underlying carrier services—as “information services,”45 while 
still preventing carrier abuses through the enforcement of net neutrality 
norms.46  
In 1998, the Commission began considering how to appropriately 
classify broadband services, beginning with the puzzle posed by cable 
Internet service providers.47 Cable broadband providers vertically integrated 
many of the functions that were sold separately by “enhanced service” 
providers like AOL. In fact, one of the justifications for the AOL-Time 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regs (Third 
Computer Inquiry), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 85-397, 50 Fed. Reg. 
33581 (1985). This final proceeding in the trilogy of Inquiries lasted over a decade, 
spawning a plethora of orders and related litigation. E.g., Amendment of Sections 
64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regs (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 
FCC 86-252, 104 F.C.C. 2d 958 (1986), vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 
F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993); California 
v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994). In the end, Computer III replaced the “maximum 
separation” rule with a variety of technical rules mandating interconnection and a 
series of accounting safeguards to prevent cross-subsidization and potentially 
anticompetitive pricing practices. See generally Computer III Remand Proceedings: 
Bell Operating Co. Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange Co. Safeguards, Report 
and Order, FCC 91-381, 6 FCC Rcd. 7571 (1991), vacated in part sub nom. 
California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 44. The motivation to remove the maximum separation rule was driven, in part, 
by a Chicago School-based understanding of the benefits of vertical integration. But 
as we explain further, such an understanding of vertical integration understates the 
possibility for network platforms to make anticompetitive use of vertical agreements 
by, for example, exclusion. 
 45. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 5; DSL Reclassification Order, supra 
note 10. 
 46. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Policy Statement, FCC 05-151, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986, para. 4 (2005), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-151A1.pdf. 
 47. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. 
Capability to All Ams. in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, Notice of Inquiry, FCC 
98-187, 13 FCC Rcd. 15280, paras. 77–82 (1998). 
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Warner merger in 2000 was facilitating such integration.48 Cable providers 
therefore seemed to be offering what, under the Computer Inquiries model, 
would have been two services: a telecommunications service and an 
information service. 49  Consequently, based on the statutory text of the 
Telecommunications Act—which, as we have noted, codified the Computer 
II regime—the Ninth Circuit concluded that cable operators were clearly 
offering both services.50 
In 2002, the FCC departed from the interpretation derived from its 
Computer Inquiries by reclassifying all of the layers of cable modem service 
as one single “information service.”51 This designation had the critical effect 
of exempting it from the regulatory structure of Title II.52 The Commission’s 
reclassification rested on a few critical facts. First, the Commission 
compared the commercial offering of a cable modem service provider with 
the predominant alternative at the time: a dial-up internet connection offered 
by an independent provider like Earthlink or AOL (before its merger).53 Such 
Internet service providers typically offered a bundle of Internet services that 
were not themselves separable and had no separate legal status: a 
subscription to AOL came with access to an aol.com email address, to AOL-
based newsgroups, as well as to the domain name system (“DNS”).54 So too 
with cable modem service: A cable modem subscriber had access, for 
example, to a [provider].net email address, a DNS, and other related 
services. 55  Thus, because dial-up Internet services were considered 
information services,56 the Commission reasoned that cable modem service 
must also be an information service.57 
Critical to the FCC’s decision was its enigmatic conclusion that the 
“telecommunications component is not . . . separable from the data-
processing capabilities of the [cable modem] service.”58 Dial-up Internet 
access providers, such as AOL, sold only data processing capabilities; the 
transmission component was separately sold and provided by each 
subscriber’s respective phone company. 59  By contrast, the Commission 
noted that, at the time, no “cable modem service provider ha[d] made a stand-
                                                                                                                 
 48. WU, supra note 11, at 264–65. 
 49. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 50. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 51. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 7. 
 52. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (“A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as 
a common carrier under this [Act] only to the extent that it is engaged in providing 
telecommunications services.”). 
 53. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 10. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at para. 17. 
 56. Id. at para. 38. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at para. 39. 
 59. Id. at para. 9, n.19. 




alone offering of transmission for a fee directly to the public.”60 Hence, the 
Commission found that “the telecommunications is part and parcel of cable 
modem service and is integral to its other capabilities” such as email and 
newsgroups. 61  The Commission’s conclusion that this transmission 
capability was inseparable from the rest of the commercial offering was 
questionable in 2002; today, as we discuss below, it seems clearly erroneous 
given the widespread demand for independent services that compete with a 
provider’s bundled offering. 62  
The Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the FCC’s Cable Modem 
Order in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X 
Internet Services.63 Although Brand X is a favorite of administrative law 
aficionados for its discussion of judicial deference to administrative agencies 
under Chevron,64 the decision is, at its core, about telecommunications law. 
The majority in Brand X found sufficient ambiguity in the 
Telecommunications Act’s definition of “telecommunications service”—
“the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public”65—that 
the Court deferred to the Commission’s conclusion that cable modem service 
fell outside of its ambit.66 In particular, the Court noted that the critical 
question for the Cable Modem Order was whether “from the consumer’s 
point of view” the data transmission service is used “always in connection 
with the information-processing capabilities.”67 The Court concluded that it 
was: The transmission component, after all, was in the Commission’s view 
“part and parcel” of the rest of the service.68 Because the Court determined 
that “offering can reasonably be read to mean a ‘stand-alone’ offering,” it 
held that the Commission need not treat “the underlying telecommunications 
used to transmit that service” as a separate “offer” under the 
Telecommunications Act’s regime.69 
Although the Court deferred to the Commission’s conclusion in the 
Cable Modem Order, some members were doubtful. Justice Breyer noted 
that the Commission’s interpretation “just barely” fell within the “scope of 
the [FCC’s] statutorily delegated authority.” 70  Three justices dissented, 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. at paras. 39–40. 
 61. Id. at para. 40. 
 62. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 63. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
973–74 (2005). 
 64. Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see 
also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83 (under Chevron, an agency interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute can override prior judicial interpretation). 
 65. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2010). 
 66. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 993. 
 67. Id. at 988. 
 68. Id. (quoting Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 39). 
 69. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989. 
 70. Id. at 1003 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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writing that “the telecommunications component of the cable-modem 
service retains such an ample independent identity that it must be regarded 
as being on offer.”71 Despite this skepticism from four justices, the Court 
upheld the Commission’s Cable Modem Order. Propelled by its victory in 
Brand X, the Commission extended the “information service” designation to 
Internet access via DSL (digital subscriber lines)72 and to other physical 
platforms,73 including wireless networks.74  
These various reclassification orders threatened to undermine the 
FCC’s long-held regulatory aim of protecting application layer companies 
from the threat of discrimination and blocking by carriers.75 Former FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell proposed that some behavior once prohibited by 
Title II would still be punished under a net neutrality regime that could be 
enforced even under the new classification. In a 2004 speech, Powell 
proposed four “Internet Freedoms,”76 which the Commission later codified 
as a policy statement,77 and which served as a baseline for the Open Internet 
Order.78 Notably, in 2005, the Commission seemed to assume that it retained 
authority to enforce its policy statement under its Title II powers. Faced with 
the first major complaint regarding the blocking of Internet traffic, the 
Commission settled with Madison River Communications to resolve the 
claim that the company was blocking Voice over Internet Protocol 
applications in violation of Section 201 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.79 Since reaching that settlement, however, the Commission has faced 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 1008 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
 72. DSL Reclassification Order, supra note 10. 
 73. United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding 
the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Serv. as an Info. 
Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 06-165, 21 FCC Rcd. 13281 (2006). 
 74. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet 
Over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, FCC 07-30, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007). 
 75. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
 76. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons 
Symposium on “The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for 
the Internet Age,” (Feb. 8, 2004), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf.  
 77. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Policy Statement, FCC 05-151, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986, para. 4 (2005), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-151A1.pdf. 
 78. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 5.  
 79. Madison River Communications, LLC and Affiliated Companies, Consent 
Decree, DA 05-543, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, paras. 4 & 6 (2005), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf. The Consent 
Decree notes that the FCC was investigating “Madison River’s compliance with 
section 201(b) . . . with respect to the blocking of ports used for Voice over Internet 
Protocol (“VoIP”) applications.” Id. at para. 1. Section 201(b) provides that “[a]ll 
charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such 




formidable legal challenges to its authority to enforce these principles, losing 
before the D.C. Circuit in 201080 and again in 2014.81 
III. PRESENT OPTIONS 
For half a century, the FCC has maintained some system for policing 
the power of carriers to block or discriminate against application layer 
businesses attempting to reach customers over carrier wires.82 The recent 
invalidation of the Commission’s Open Internet Order in Verizon83 casts that 
basic premise into doubt for the first time in the history of modern computer 
networking. Unsurprisingly, the Commission has responded by indicating 
that it will seek to reinforce its authority by whatever means necessary.84 The 
operative question, then, is how the Commission can most easily accomplish 
this goal.    
The FCC’s decision to sweep the transmission of Internet traffic 
outside of the definitional scope of “telecommunications service” has 
significantly affected its ability to regulate such traffic. 85  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 explicitly provides that a “carrier shall be 
treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is 
engaged in providing telecommunications services.” 86  Thus, where a 
facilities owner—a carrier—is providing a service other than 
“telecommunications” (as the term is statutorily defined87), the Commission 
                                                                                                                 
communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, 
classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful.” 
47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
 80. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 81. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 82. See discussion supra Part II (chronicling the FCC’s Computer Inquiries and 
the Open Internet Order). 
 83. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659. 
 84. Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
FCC 14-61, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Open Internet NPRM]; see 
also New Docket Established to Address Open Internet Remand, Public Notice, DA 
14-211 (Feb. 19, 2014), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-211A1.pdf (establishing a 
new docket to consider path forward based on “authority under section 706 and all 
other available sources of Commission authority” (emphasis added)). 
 85. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 84, at para. 149. 
 86. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X. 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005) (“The Act regulates telecommunications 
carriers, but not information-service providers, as common carriers.”).The provision 
was originally codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(49), and was moved to subsection 51 
following subsequent amendments to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Pub. 
L. No. 105-33, § 3001(b) (1997) (adding new (49) and renumbering) and Pub. L. No. 
111-260, § 101 (2010) (renumbering). 
 87. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2006). 
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has disabled itself from regulating that service as a common carrier.88 The 
Commission has twice sought alternative ways of regulating Internet traffic. 
Both attempts were squarely rejected by the D.C. Circuit. First, the 
Commission’s attempt to rely on its ancillary authority was rejected in 
Comcast;89 more recently, in Verizon, the court held that the Commission’s 
Open Internet Order imposed on broadband providers rules tantamount to 
common carrier regulation in violation of the Communications Act’s 
“specific prohibition[s]” described above.90  
Some have suggested that section 706 of the Telecommunications Act 
can provide the FCC with the authority to enforce basic network neutrality 
norms with some limitations. 91  We do not express any opinion on this 
hypothesis. Our present focus, instead, is on the Commission’s traditional 
power to regulate carriers. Some have called for the Commission to overturn 
its 2002 reclassification decision.92 As explained in more detail below, we 
agree that the Cable Modem Order’s conclusions no longer have a 
substantial basis in fact.93 However, we begin with a more modest solution: 
a narrow application of the Commission’s strongest and most secure grant of 
congressional power: Title II of the Telecommunications Act.94 
A. Sender Side Transmission Rules  
Over the course of Verizon’s challenge to the Open Internet Order, the 
FCC and Verizon articulated distinct and competing visions of the nature of 
the relationship between broadband carriers and content providers. The 
Commission argued that content providers were not, in any meaningful 
sense, “customers” of a broadband carrier; to the contrary, the Commission 
argued that broadband subscribers are the only necessary customers, and the 
relationship between a content provider and the carrier is simply derivative 
                                                                                                                 
 88. What it means to be “treated as a common carrier” remains unclear and 
fiercely contested. See, e.g., Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(“The Act’s definition of ‘common carrier’ is unsatisfyingly circular . . . .”). 
 89. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 90. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 649–50 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 91. E.g., Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks at Silicon Flatirons, 
Univ. Colo. Law School (Feb. 10, 2014), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-325531A1.pdf; Tejas N. 
Narechania, Federal and State Authority for Network Neutrality and Broadband 
Regulation, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404996. 
 92. See, e.g., Comments of Pub. Knowledge & Common Cause at 11–12, Open 
Internet Remand, FCC GN Docket No. 14-28 (rel. Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/documents/Public_Knowledge_ 
Common_Cause_Open_Internet_706_Public_Notice_Comments.pdf. 
 93. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 94. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–221. 




of any request by that customer to view specified content.95 The D.C. Circuit 
rejected this construction. 96  Instead, it adopted the view proffered by 
Verizon, which argued that there were two distinct, separable, and equally 
important commercial relationships at issue: (1) the broadband provider’s 
contract with “retail end-users” as well as (2) its relationship with “other 
providers that seek to deliver their own services over the common carrier’s 
facilities.”97 The D.C. Circuit agreed that these were better treated as distinct 
relationships.98 But in so doing, the court stated that it would be “logical to 
conclude that [a broadband provider] may be a common carrier with regard 
to some activities but not others.”99 In other words, by individuating these 
two commercial relationships, the court suggested the possibility for the 
distinct regulatory treatment of these separable transactions. 
Therefore, rather than treat all Internet traffic as a monolithic entity 
subject to the same regulatory treatment, the FCC can split the facilities-
based services offered by broadband carriers into two discrete transactions: 
first, a call by a broadband subscriber to request data from a third-party 
content provider; and second, a content provider’s response to the subscriber. 
Imposing this two-stage call-and-response framework on the structure of 
Internet traffic—a framework derived from the D.C. Circuit’s recent 
decision in Verizon—would allow the Commission to separately consider 
the appropriate regulatory treatment for each type of transaction. 
This creates an obvious opportunity for the FCC to classify—in the 
first instance—one of these relationships as subject to some form of 
regulation under Title II. In particular, the Commission should consider the 
appropriate regulatory treatment of traffic that is sent by content providers 
in response to requests from retail end-users.100 One important reason to 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Brief for Appellee/Respondents at 60–63, Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1355) [hereinafter FCC Brief]. 
 96. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2014); but see City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013) (under a hypothetical statute, a court 
must defer to agency’s definition of “common carrier”). 
 97. Joint Reply Brief for Verizon & MetroPCS at 1, 6–8, Verizon v. FCC, 740 
F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1355) [hereinafter Verizon Reply Brief]. 
 98. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 653. 
 99. Id. (citing NARUC v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see also 
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979). 
 100. Here, we use the term “response” somewhat loosely. We do not mean to 
cabin the applicability of our proposed framework to only particularized sorts of 
real-time “dialogues” between a user and a content provider. The framework is 
equally applicable to asynchronous communications (e.g., a user, who hosts her own 
email service, who receives an email days after an offline communication with an 
acquaintance). Rather, the point is that the commercial offer to deliver incoming 
traffic (incoming from the perspective of the access network) is distinguishable from 
the offer to the consumer for a broadband subscription. Happily, the offer to deliver 
unwanted incoming traffic, such as spam or malware, is also distinguishable, 
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consider distinct regulatory treatment for this aspect of the broadband 
transaction is that the broadband carrier is endowed with a terminating 
monopoly.101 That is, the content provider has no alternative to the carrier to 
complete its response to the calling consumer. Such terminating monopolies 
have traditionally been subject to enhanced regulatory scrutiny, and the 
Commission’s policies have, in recent years, strongly disfavored “access 
charges” imposed by terminating monopolists.  
Classifying “sender-side” traffic as a telecommunications service is 
also, perhaps surprisingly, consistent with the Cable Modem Order. As we 
described above, 102  the Commission’s analysis in that Order focused 
squarely on the broadband provider’s relationship with the end user. In 
considering the “business relationships” between “cable operators” and 
“consumers,” the Commission examined only retail subscribers to 
broadband service.103 Indeed, even the Supreme Court agreed that the critical 
question addressed in the Cable Modem Order was what a broadband 
subscription looked like “from the consumer’s point of view.”104 Thus, this 
specific focus on the set of bundled services that broadband providers sold 
their subscribers excluded any analysis of the opposing offer to charge for 
the delivery of traffic in the second stage of the two-stage framework 
described above.105  
Despite this exclusion, both the D.C. Circuit and the FCC have 
proceeded on the assumption that the conclusion reached in the Cable 
Modem Order applies equally across both the call and the response 
transactions.106 But the decision in Verizon makes clear that this need not be 
so. Indeed, the Commission has a long history of regulating a carrier in its 
                                                                                                                 
creating space for the FCC to create narrow exceptions for reasonable network 
management, as it had in the Open Internet Order. 
 101. See 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 84, at para. 42 (finding that 
broadband providers are “terminating monopolies” for content providers needing to 
reach end users, because “most residential customers have only one or two options 
for wireline broadband Internet access service.”).  
 102. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 103. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 30. 
 104. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X. Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
988 (2005). 
 105. Even to the extent that the Cable Modem Order considered content offered 
through internet service providers, it emphasized that this content is typically 
bundled—from the consumer’s perspective—with the broadband service. See Cable 
Modem Order, supra note 5, at paras. 52–53 (arrangements with unaffiliated ISPs 
offer an integrated service for which both the provider and the ISP take dual 
responsibility). The same cannot be said for YouTube or Netflix content that is 
delivered by Comcast. Cf. The ISP Speed Index From Netflix, NETFLIX, 
http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/ (last visited April 2014) (Netflix reporting on 
differences among facilities owners over which it sends content). 
 106. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 654–655 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting 
classification decision as applicable). 




capacity as a terminating monopolist differently than in its capacity as a 
vendor of retail, end-user services.107 
A closer analysis of the service that a broadband provider, in its 
capacity as a terminating monopolist, offers to a content provider in sender-
side response transactions bears none of the hallmarks of an information 
service as described by the Cable Modem Order.108 When Verizon delivers 
Netflix content to Verizon subscribers, it does not also offer Netflix “e-mail, 
newsgroups, and the ability to create a web page . . . .”109 Instead, Verizon 
provides a discrete transmission service: It delivers traffic from the point of 
interconnection to a specified subscriber. 
Verizon now wants to charge some content providers for this 
delivery.110 Notably, the Cable Modem Order’s conclusion rested in part on 
the observation that no broadband “provider ha[d] made a stand-alone 
offering of transmission for a fee.”111 But Verizon’s new proposal is exactly 
that:112 It is a stand-alone offer of “transmission” “between . . . points” that 
Netflix (for example) has “specified.” 113  This is paradigmatic 
“telecommunications service” that may be subject to regulation under Title 
II.114 That is, the transmission of data from the Internet to an individual 
subscriber not only retains an “independent identity that it must be regarded 
as being on offer”—it seems to be the only identity that can be regarded as 
on offer.115 Thus, relying on the distinction drawn by Verizon in its challenge 
to the Open Internet Order, the Commission can classify commercial offers 
to deliver sender-side traffic, beginning at the point of interconnection, as a 
telecommunications service under the 1996 Act.116 
B. Changed Circumstances 
As an alternative to the limited classification of sender-side traffic, the 
FCC could return to its original position that the transmission of all Internet 
traffic is a “telecommunications service.” 117  That is, rather than simply 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See, e.g., Verizon Reply Brief, supra note 97, at 6–7. 
 108. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at paras. 34–37. 
 109. See id. at para. 37. 
 110. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645–46. 
 111. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at paras. 39–40. 
 112. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646 (“[B]ut for the Open Internet Order [Verizon] 
would be exploring . . . commercial arrangements” to charge for the delivery of 
sender-side traffic). 
 113. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2006). Here, the “user” is Netflix, and 
“points . . . specified” are the point of interconnection and the “calling” subscriber. 
 114. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2006). 
 115. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X. Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1008 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 116. See Verizon Reply Brief, supra note 97, at 1. 
 117. There is one further wrinkle with regard to mobile Internet service. Section 
332 of the Telecommunications Act states that providers of “commercial mobile 
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cabining the reach of Cable Modem Order to its original context—the call 
transaction—the Commission could undertake to address both stages of 
traffic by revisiting its conclusions in the Cable Modem Order.118 
On this point, it is important to emphasize that no legal bar prevents 
the FCC from undoing its decision in the Cable Modem Order. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that agencies have “ample latitude 
to ‘adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing 
circumstances.’”119 Indeed, changed circumstances seem to have invalidated 
many of the factual premises underlying the Commission’s 2002 Cable 
Modem Order. That decision rests on a now-outdated understanding of 
cable-based broadband offerings: subscribers then “d[id] not need to contract 
separately” for “discrete services or applications.”120 Not only were these 
integrated applications “part and parcel” of the subscription package, 121 
but—in the view of the Cable Modem Order—they formed a critical part of 
the value of the service to consumers.122 
Today, it is no longer clear that these additional services add 
measurable value to broadband subscriptions. To be sure, the Cable Modem 
Order acknowledged the existence of competing content at the time it was 
adopted; it noted that, “by ‘click-through’ access,” cable modem service 
offers “many functions from companies with whom the cable operator has 
not even a contractual relationship. For example, a subscriber . . . is free to 
download and use . . . a web browser from Netscape, content from Fox 
                                                                                                                 
services” are common carriers, whereas providers of other mobile services are 
exempt from common carrier regulation. 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006). The FCC has 
concluded that wireless transmission of Internet traffic both “is an ‘information 
service’ and is not a ‘commercial mobile service.’” Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 
534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Thus, “mobile-data providers are statutorily immune, 
perhaps twice over, from treatment as common carriers.” Id. 
Reclassification for wireless broadband would require undoing both layers of 
protection. See id. For present purposes we focus on the question that is common to 
all physical platforms for the transmission of Internet traffic: the information service 
designation. For now, it suffices to note that the FCC would have to also address the 
“commercial mobile service” finding of the Wireless Classification Order. 22 FCC 
Rcd. 5901, para. 37 (2007). That would require the FCC to conclude that wireless 
internet service is “for profit,” is an “interconnected service,” and is available “to 
the public or . . . to a substantial portion of the public,” as those terms are defined in 
the Telecommunication Act. 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (2006). 
 118. See generally Cable Modem Order, supra note 5. 
 119. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 
747, 784 (1968)). 
 120. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 11. 
 121.  Id. at paras. 11, 39. 
 122. Id. at para. 11 (accessing “unaffiliated” content “may require the subscriber 
to pay those entities an additional fee”); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n 
v. Brand X. Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 988 (2005). 




News, and e-mail in the form of Microsoft’s ‘Hotmail.’” 123  The Cable 
Modem Order, however, de-emphasized the import of these options, 
suggesting that they were simply redundant because such “functions 
currently are all [also] included in the standard cable modem service 
offering.”124  
The FCC did, however, wisely note the inchoate nature of the 
broadband business and conceded that “[c]ustomers, for their part, are still 
learning the capabilities of cable modem service and deciding which 
applications they prefer.” 125  The intervening decade of experience has 
provided the Commission with vast data regarding actual consumer 
preferences between those affiliated applications that were critical to its 
determination that broadband access was properly classified an information 
service and other unaffiliated options. These data indicate that independent 
email services, such as Gmail and Outlook.com (formerly Hotmail), 
dominate comparable services that are supplied by broadband providers.126 
And the majority of Internet traffic is for content outside of the “services or 
applications” that are provisioned through the broadband subscription.127 
Furthermore, while the FCC once expressed concern that “additional 
fee[s]” might deter a broadband subscriber from accessing “unaffiliated” 
content, the recent proliferation of paid broadband-based services, such as 
Netflix, suggests that such a concern is no longer well-founded.128 That is, 
consumers are not only willing to access unaffiliated advertisement-
supported content, they are also willing to pay to access content outside of 
that which is built into a broadband carrier’s offering.129  
                                                                                                                 
 123. Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 25. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at para. 30. 
 126. See MARK GAYNOR, NETWORK SERVICES INVESTMENT GUIDE 124–125 
(2002) (“By 1999, more Web-based email boxes existed in the United States and 
internationally than the total number of ISP-based email accounts . . . .”); see also 
What Does Your ISP Say About You?, MAILCHIMP (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://blog.mailchimp.com/what-does-your-isp-say-about-you/ (data from an web-
based email service provider showing that web-based email services outpace the 
popularity of ISP-based services); Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 25 
(contrast between outside service providers and affiliated services). 
 127. See SANDVINE, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 5-6 (2H 2013) (28% 
of traffic associated with Netflix, 17% with YouTube, 7% with BitTorrent, 3% with 
iTunes, 1% each for Amazon Video, Hulu, and Facebook, for a total of 58%).  
 128. Netflix has 33 million U.S. members, as compared to an estimated 115 
million households in the U.S. Without controlling for household broadband access, 
Netflix alone has achieved 29% market penetration. Compare Letter from Reed 
Hastings, CEO, Netflix, Inc., to Shareholders (Jan. 22, 2014), with Daphne Lofquist 
et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Households and Families: 2010, in 2010 U.S. CENSUS 
BRIEFS (Apr. 2012).  
 129. See SANDVINE, supra note 127, at 6 (28% traffic for Netflix, 17% for 
YouTube). 
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Taken together, this evidence suggests a consumer preference to use 
the provider’s transmission service to connect to third-party content services. 
Unlike the conclusions reached in the Cable Modem Order, end users do not 
use broadband transmission capabilities “always in connection” with the 
services offered by the provider.130 To the contrary, end users increasingly 
view broadband service as providing predominantly a transmission service 
that connects them to content services provided by other entities, rather than 
as an integrated information service. 131  Viewed on the terms of Cable 
Modem Order—which emphasized the retail subscriber’s view of the 
commercial “offer” 132 —the information service designation based on 
bundled services now seems quaint. 
One bundled service bears special attention. Of critical importance to 
practically every broadband subscriber is the Domain Name System 
(“DNS”) service. Stated simply, DNS service allows a web user to reach a 
particular website; www.fcc.gov, for example, is a signifier for a unique 
numerical address—an IP address—such as 192.104.54.5. A DNS service 
acts as an automated phone book, translating between the easily-remembered 
website name and its unique address. Standard web traffic, which still 
comprises roughly ten percent of all Internet traffic in North America,133 
depends on accurate DNS service. End users, then, seem to contract for DNS 
service when they subscribe for broadband access.134  
That broadband subscribers contract for DNS service, however, need 
not mean that they are purchasing an information service. Indeed, even the 
Cable Modem Order itself provides no clear guidance as to whether DNS 
services are categorized as “data processing” or “transmission” services.135 
Turning to the statute, “telecommunications” is defined to mean “the 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X. Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
988 (2005). 
 131. For a list of capabilities that even the Cable Modem Order considers to be 
within the “basic level” transmission functions, see Cable Modem Order, supra note 
5, at para. 17 (“physical connection between the cable system and the Internet by 
operating or interconnecting with Internet backbone facilities . . . . protocol 
conversion, IP address number assignment, domain name resolution through a 
domain name system (DNS), network security, and caching”). 
 132. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 988; see also Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, 
at para. 35 (examining “the functions that cable modem service makes available to 
its end users”). 
 133. SANDVINE, supra note 127, at 5 (HTTP traffic comprises 9% of internet 
traffic).  
 134. Although most DNS service comes with broadband service, it is 
increasingly offered on a stand-alone basis by independent entities (e.g., OpenDNS, 
Google DNS). 
 135. Compare Cable Modem Order, supra note 5, at para. 17 (“[B]asic” 
“functions” to “transmit data” include “domain name resolution through a domain 
name system (DNS)”), with id. at para. 37 (“DNS constitutes a general purpose 
information processing . . . capability”). 




transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information 
of the user’s choosing.” 136  DNS service, then, merely enables 
telecommunications: In seeking to visit a website, the user identifies the 
information they want (the website) and the location from which they want 
it (www.fcc.gov), and requests that it be transmitted back to them. Any 
intermediate action to translate the website name to a particular address137 is 
no more than a functional step carried out in service of that transmission.  
Other policy considerations undercut the prevailing “information 
service” designation. The DSL Reclassification Order—one of the 
proceedings that followed soon after the Cable Modem Order—concluded 
that an “access requirement impedes deployment of innovative wireline 
broadband services.”138 The Commission has since rejected this reasoning, 
stating in its Open Internet Order that “openness is critical to . . . increased 
end-user demand for broadband, which drives network improvements.”139 
That is, the Commission now believes that the statutory aims of the 
Telecommunications Act are more easily met through regulated access rules 
rather than deregulated access.  
“Regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever,” 
the Supreme Court has explained; the “forces of change do not always or 
necessarily point in the direction of deregulation.”140 The FCC retains the 
ability to re-examine the conclusions it reached in the Cable Modem Order 
                                                                                                                 
 136. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (50) (2006). 
 137. The fact that either the address or the content might be cached, that different 
DNS services might point to two distinct but identical copies of the same website, 
or even that a single DNS might dynamically cycle through different locations for 
the same content need not change this conclusion. The instruction is best understood 
as a command to retrieve information from any of the available end points that 
matches www.fcc.gov. This is a reasonable construction of the phrase “points 
specified by the user;” the statute does not require that user command be so specific 
as to identify the IP address with particularity. But see Christopher Yoo, supra note 
40, at 567 (“The fact that DNS determines from which of the multiple available 
endpoints a particular query will be served makes it hard to characterize Internet 
communications as being between “points specified by the user” as required by the 
definition of telecommunications service.”). The FCC can permissibly construe the 
“points specified by the user” as simply “my computer” and “FCC,” and allow the 
user to defer to the network’s best judgment as to how to deliver that content. The 
point is further illustrated by a call forwarding service. Telephone service subscribers 
can request that incoming calls to them be forwarded to an alternate number even 
before reaching the end point (that is, the call forwarding is carried out by the 
network, not by the handset). In such cases, the network will dynamically reroute 
the call to an appropriate location in order to effectuate the intent of the caller. Yet 
the use of call forwarding does not mean that the telephone call is no longer a 
telecommunications service. 
 138. DSL Reclassification Order, supra note 10, at para. 97. 
 139. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 14. 
 140. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 37, 42 (1983) (alterations and citations omitted). 
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and its subsequent related decisions. A number of “chang[ed] circumstances” 
support the decision to treat broadband access as a telecommunications 
service. For one, consumer behavior suggests the users increasingly view 
broadband as a transmission service providing access to independent content 
providers and other subscription services, rather than as a bundle of 
applications that rely on an underlying faster-than-dial-up transmission 
service. That is, the “offer,” which has always been capacious enough to 
include a telecommunications service, 141  is increasingly seen as 
predominantly a telecommunications service. 142  Furthermore, the 
Commission’s view of how to best promote the statutory aims of the 
Telecommunications Act has fundamentally shifted: 143  where the 
Commission once thought that a nondiscrimination rule would deter network 
investment, it now believes that such rules will “increase incentives to invest 
in broadband infrastructure.” 144  Given these “chang[ed] circumstances,” 
including the shift in the “agency’s view of what is in the public interest,” 
the Commission can provide an amply reasoned analysis for reinstituting its 
classification of the transmission of Internet traffic as a telecommunications 
service.145 
C. Proceeding by Adjudication 
So far we have examined two routes for the FCC to consider as it 
forges a path forward from Verizon. But there are more permutations to 
consider; the Commission has a variety of procedural options, regardless of 
the substantive path it chooses.  
Consider, for example, section 208 of the Communications Act,146 
which gives the Commission the adjudicatory authority to investigate and 
resolve complaints against common carriers.147 In particular, it allows the 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X. Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
967 (2005). 
 142. Cf. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 29, at para. 1. 
 143. See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006) (“The Commission . . . shall encourage the 
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications 
[broadband] capability to all Americans.”). 
 144. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 1, at para. 40. 
 145. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57. 
 146. 47 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). Although we briefly discuss Section 208 here, we 
do not mean to opine on the proper scope of the rules that the FCC should impose 
under Title II. We note only that the FCC has, in the past, noted that it could 
“forbear . . . from all but a small handful of provisions necessary for effective 
implementation” of its policy goals. Framework for Broadband Internet Serv., Notice 
of Inquiry, FCC 10-114, 25 FCC Rcd. 7866, para. 28 (2010). We do not comment on 
which provisions of Title II are ripe for such forbearance. 
 147. Section 403 offers similar authority, but allows the FCC to act sua sponte. 
47 U.S.C. § 403 (2006) (“The Commission shall have full authority and power at 




FCC to initiate an inquiry into conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Commission’s long-held goal of protecting application layer services from 
untoward carrier behavior.148 If, for example, broadband carriers were to 
begin to discriminate against unaffiliated competing content, the 
Commission might reconsider its classification decisions through a series of 
adjudicatory proceedings. One such proceeding might address only sender-
side traffic if the alleged violation affects only incoming traffic, or if it 
involves an interconnection dispute. A subsequent adjudication might 
expand the scope of inquiry as necessary. 
The Commission, of course, retains the discretion to choose the mode 
of policymaking that it believes best serves the public interest.149 So long as 
the Commission’s “adjudicative procedures . . . produce the relevant 
information to mature and fair consideration of the issues,” it is entitled to 
“proceed with caution, developing its standards in a case-by-case manner 
. . . .”150  
In other words, the FCC can establish by adjudication that an offer to 
transmit data sent by a content provider to a subscriber is a 
“telecommunications service” subject to regulation under Title II.151 And the 
Commission can then make an individual determination as to whether the 
particular practice at issue is “unjust” or an “unreasonable discrimination” 
against an application-layer service, 152  and enjoin the practice as 
necessary. 153  This approach has the notable benefit of allowing the 
Commission to operate on a case-by-case basis,154 thereby creating room for 
the flexible administration of policy in a still-evolving technological 
space.155 
                                                                                                                 
any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter 
or thing concerning which complaint is authorized to be made . . . .”). 
 148. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
 149. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); see also Verizon Tel. 
Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 150. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 268; see generally Benjamin Kapnik, Affirming 
the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency Adjudications, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1527 (2012) (reviewing quality of FCC adjudicatory process). 
 151. See supra Part III.A. 
 152. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
 153. We note, for the sake of completeness, that the FCC would likely be unable 
to impose retrospective fines in cases that present first-of-their-kind departures from 
governing standards (including settled expectations regarding the reach of various 
classification decisions). See generally Verizon Tel. Cos., 269 F.3d at 1098. 
Nevertheless, the FCC can clearly order injunctive relief, which is the more 
important—and more practical—remedy. 
 154. Wheeler, supra note 91. 
 155. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast 
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, FCC 08-183, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, paras. 30–32 (2008) (arguments in favor 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For nearly a half-century, the FCC has attempted to nurture the growth 
of the various application-layer industries by protecting them from the 
potential for owners of basic network infrastructure to block their content 
and discriminate against their services. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Verizon v. FCC to strike down the Commission’s Open Internet Order has 
undermined the agency’s ability to continue its efforts in service of that goal. 
The FCC, however, is hardly helpless in the face of this setback. As 
we have explained, the Commission might follow a previously unconsidered 
option under Title II of the Communications Act. As Verizon itself argued, 
a broadband transaction can be understood as occurring in two-stages: a call 
and a response. This framework, which was adopted by the D.C. Circuit, 
allows the Commission to correctly characterize the response as no more 
than a telecommunications service. Such a conclusion would return the scope 
of the Cable Modem Order to its original context, while giving the 
Commission the ability to protect application service providers from 
anticompetitive carrier conduct. 
Alternatively, the Commission could expand its frame of inquiry to 
both the call and response, and hold a proceeding to examine whether 
changed circumstances have undermined the Commission’s 2002 
classification of broadband services. As described above, we are confident 
that the factual premises underlying that decision are now obsolete.  
As a legal matter, either possibility is less novel than it first appears. 
Both resemble the approach the FCC took in its Computer Inquiries. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s regulatory authority under Title II is not 
subject to serious doubt, but is naturally cabined to the context of 
telecommunications. Most recently, the D.C. Circuit mentioned that, in 
enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, “Congress clearly 
contemplated that the Commission would continue regulating internet 
providers in the manner it had previously.”156 In short, we believe that the 
proposals described here represent the most straightforward and legally 
secure measures for ensuring the continued growth of the application 
industries that have blossomed while they remained insulated from the 
anticompetitive carrier conduct. 
 
                                                                                                                 
of an adjudicatory approach), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 
642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 156. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Deployment of 
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 98-188, 13 F.C.C.R. 
at 24029–30 para. 35 (1998) (“We conclude that advanced services are 
telecommunications services.”)). 
